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In corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure has always been an 
important part. The ownership structure plays the role of supervising and controlling 
the company’s behavior. Due to the special institution background, Chinese listed 
companies’ ownership structure experienced a long time of the dual structure. Until 
2005, China implemented officially shareholder structure reform. All in all, the 
Chinese institution background provides a good place for studying ownership 
structure. Therefore, it is of great significance to further improve the structure of 
corporate governance and promote corporate efficiency from the view of the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk taking. 
The article uses the sample of A-share listed company between 2002 and 2009. 
Basing on the principal-agent theory and property rights theory, firstly, the article 
analyzes the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk taking from 
the aspects of ownership concentration and ownership control. Secondly, combined 
with the ownership nature and shareholder structure reform we further study the 
action mechanism. The results show that: there is a significantly negative correlation 
between ownership concentration and corporate risk taking, and a significant positive 
correlation between ownership control and corporate risk taking. In the influences of 
controlling shareholder vacancy and weak financial constraints in stated-owned listed 
company, the inhibitory effect between ownership concentration and corporate risk 
taking in stated-owned listed company is weaker than private listed companies, and 
the facilitation between ownership control and corporate risk taking in private listed 
companies is stronger than stated-owned listed company. In addition, after the 
implementation of shareholder structure reform, the inhibitory effect between 
ownership concentration and corporate risk taking significantly strengthened, and the 
facilitation between ownership control and corporate risk taking had no significant 
effect. It shows that the shareholder structure reform’s role of the constraint 
mechanism for shareholders has not been reflected. 
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资本市场的稳定发展。2005 年 4 月 29 日，证监会颁布《关于上市公司股权分置

















































































































对股权结构的研究， 早起源于 Berle, Means（1932）[1]的《现代公司与私







了股权集中的积极作用。Bruton G D, et al. (2010)[3]选取英国和法国共 224 家 IPO
公司的数据进行研究，得出股权集中度对 IPO 绩效的提升有促进作用。Arosa, et 

























Chen, et al. (2011)[7]对 22 个国家 3468 家公司 1996-2008 年的数据进行分析，发现
控股股东拥有的控制权过大，导致了控股股东对公司的掏空行为和道德风险行
为，即股权集中度对企业具有负面影响。 
Mock, Shleifer, Vishny(1988)[8]对 1980 年的 500 家公司数据进行研究，发现
股权集中度与公司盈利存在非线性关系，当低于 5%时，股权集中度与盈利正相
关，当处于 5%与 25%之间时二者呈负相关，当大于 25%时呈正相关。McConnell, 
Servaes(1990)[9]通过对 1976 年 1173 家公司和 1986 年 1093 家公司样本的股权结
构与托宾 Q 之间的关系进行研究，发现股权结构与托宾 Q 之间存在非线性关系，
当股权集中度低于 40%到 50%之间时，其关系为正相关，当大于 40%到 50%之
间时，呈负向关系。这意味着 40%到 50%之间的股权结构是公司价值 大的临
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